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IT’S ALL THE RAGE: POPULAR UPRISINGS
AND PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY
Dante B. Gatmaytan†
Abstract:
Massive peaceful demonstrations ended the authoritarian regime of
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines twenty years ago. The “people power” uprising was
called a democratic revolution and inspired hopes that it would lead to the consolidation
of democracy in the Philippines. When popular uprisings were later used to remove or
threaten other leaders, people power was criticized as an assault on democratic
institutions and was interpreted as a sign of the political immaturity of Filipinos. The
literature on people power is presently marked by disagreement as to whether all popular
uprisings should be considered part of the people power tradition. The debate is
grounded on the belief that people power was a democratic revolution; other uprisings are
judged on how closely they resemble events surrounding Marcos’ ouster from office.
This disagreement has become unproductive and has prevented Filipinos from asking
questions about the causes of these uprisings or the failure of democratic consolidation.
This Article departs from conventional thought and develops two alternative theories of
people power in the Philippines. The first holds that people power is an expression of
outrage against a particular public official. The second holds that it is a withdrawal of
allegiance from the official in favor of another. Neither view insists that people power is
or aspires to democratic revolution. These alternative theories hope to resuscitate the
study of Philippine democracy.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1986, millions of Filipinos gathered at a major
thoroughfare in Metro Manila to defy the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos.
After four days of protest they forced Marcos into exile as he relinquished
his twenty-one-year hold on power. In February 2001, millions of Filipinos
staged another four-day protest that shortened President Joseph Estrada’s
six-year term of office to a mere thirty-one months. A few months later, a
third gathering attended by millions of Filipinos called for the resignation of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After four days of protest, this
demonstration ended with a violent clash with the police in front of the
presidential palace.
†
Associate Professor, University of the Philippines, College of Law; Lecturer, Philippine Judicial
Academy, Supreme Court of the Philippines; Lecturer, Ateneo de Manila University, Department of
Political Science. LL.B., University of the Philippines, 1991; M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School, 1995;
LL.M., University of California, Los Angeles, 1996. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect
the views of the institutions with which the author is affiliated. The author wishes to thank Maria Cielo D.
Magno for her insights and criticisms of this article. The author also wishes to thank Mary Ann de la Peña,
Claudette de la Cerna, and Sylvia Patricia S. Rieza for providing invaluable research assistance, and the
staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for excellent editorial suggestions.
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This practice of removing Presidents by popular protest in the
Philippines is known as “people power.”1 It hovers over the political
horizon as a reminder to incumbent public officials that election results in
the Philippines are subject to a subsequent veto by the people and that public
officials can be recalled through spontaneous popular uprisings.
People power is regarded as the epicenter of a democracy movement
that spread outward from Manila, toppling authoritarian governments
including the Suharto regime of Indonesia in 1998.2 This “democratic
revolution” is credited with spawning other popular uprisings in South
Korea, Pakistan, Burma and Eastern Europe,3 and supposedly “unleashed the
pro-democracy tide that swept . . . the rest of the world.”4
Over the years, however, people power has lost some of its luster.
Hailed as a potential agent of Philippine democratization in 1986, it was by
2001 denounced as a disgrace to democracy. Once exalted, it is now
criticized as “mob rule or anarchy or coup.”5
The relative ease with which people now resort to people power and
its impact on politics make it an important subject of inquiry for social
scientists. Students of law should study its implications for many concepts
including democratic constitutionalism, rule of law, and even regime

1
“People power” is the term initially used to describe the four-day non-violent popular
demonstration that started on February 22, 1986, on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (“EDSA”) in Manila.
The demonstrations followed a conspicuously fraudulent presidential election and played a decisive part in
persuading President Ferdinand Marcos to leave the Philippines and live in exile in the United States. See
MICHAEL LEIFER, DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN POLITICS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 186 (1995). EDSA is a
major road in Metro Manila that served as the setting for this display of opposition to the Marcos regime
which allowed Corazon Aquino to assume the presidency. Id. at 91.
2
Vincent Boudreau, Diffusing Democracy? People Power in Indonesia and the Philippines, 31
BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 3 (1999).
3
Thomas M. Franck, Seizing the Moment: Creative and Incremental Thinking about Global
Systemic Opportunity 22 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 601, 623-624 (1990).
4
Editorial, People Power II Uprising As Millstone, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 23, 2004, at
A7. In Asia, people power is said to have inspired successful democratic revolutions in South Korea,
Bangladesh, and Nepal, and ineffectual ones in Burma and China. See Jose Manuel Tesoro & Ricardo
Saludo, The Legacy of People Power, ASIAWEEK, March 1, 1996. People power is also said to have struck
at communist states in the early 1990s in Europe. Id. at 22. In November 2003, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze resigned amid massive protests over election results. See BBC News UK Edition, Nov. 24,
2003 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3231534.stm. In South America, Bolivia’s
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada joined a list of presidents who were forced from office by massive
protests. Also in the list are Argentina’s Fernando de la Rua, (December 2001), Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador
(January 2000), and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (November 2000). Another Ecuadorian president, Abdalá
Bucaram, was forced out in 1997. See Lucien O. Chauvin, People Power Rules in South America, THE
NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1021/p06s01-woam.html.
5
Seth Mydans, “People Power” and Unintended Consequences, January 7, 2004, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/124126.html.
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change. Yet, the phenomenon seems scarcely noticed by academics in
general and legal scholarship in particular.6
Instead, recent literature on people power has degenerated into a
squabble over whether subsequent mass uprisings are genuine
manifestations of the phenomenon. This unfortunate turn of events is the
product of a tendency in the literature to compare all uprisings to the events
surrounding the removal of Marcos. The 1986 version of people power is
touted as a “democratic revolution” and has become the standard against
which subsequent uprisings are measured. Those that do not meet this
standard are disparaged as poor facsimiles or perversions of people power.
This Article attempts to resuscitate the discussion on people power by
examining recent developments in Philippine politics. I suggest that we
disassociate people power from democratic revolutions because Filipinos
never attempted a fundamental change in political organization or
government. It was directed against Marcos alone. The anti-authoritarian
theme of Marcos’ removal was incidental to popular outrage over his
attempt to nullify the results of the 1986 elections, which were believed to
favor his rival Corazon C. Aquino.
In place of the “democratic revolution” view, this Article develops
two alternative accounts of people power in the Philippines. The first holds
that people power is an expression of outrage against a particular public
official, triggered by government action. The second holds that it is a
withdrawal of allegiance from the official in favor of another. Neither of
these views is burdened by the insistence that people power is or aspires to
democratic revolution.
Reorienting the discourse along the lines of these alternatives should
prevent sterile debates about whether popular uprisings merit the title
“people power.” This approach examines the nature of people power
distinctly from attempts to explain the failure of democratic consolidation in
post-Marcos Philippines.
The argument proceeds in several stages. Part II reviews the instances
of people power in the Philippines that began with the removal of Ferdinand
Marcos in 1986. Part III examines the views of social scientists and political
analysts on people power and provides an overview of the discourse on
popular uprisings in the Philippines. Part IV critically reviews one of most
sustained attempts to pull these various observations together into a theory
of the nature of people power. Ultimately rejecting this theory, Part V
6
See Mark R. Thompson, Whatever Happened to Democratic Revolutions?, 7 DEMOCRATIZATION
1-20 (2000).

4

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 1

develops two alternative approaches to understanding people power.
Finally, there is occasion for an epilogue: very recent events involving the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration present an opportunity to test the
arguments presented in this Article.
II.

PEOPLE POWER AND ITS PROGENY

A.

Ousting a Dictator

Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines in 1965,
and again in 1969. Faced with a constitutional bar to a third term, he
initiated a revision of the Constitution, with a view to shifting to a
parliamentary form of government. Marcos declared martial law in 1972,
ostensibly to respond to threats from communist groups, perpetuating
himself in power for another fourteen years.7 Under pressure from the
international community to prove that he continued to have the Filipinos’
mandate, Marcos called for a “snap election” to be held on February 7,
1986.8 The opposition fielded Corazon Aquino, the widow of a former
Senator who was Marcos’ fiercest critic.9
Despite the widespread use of fraud, intimidation and terrorism, the
National Assembly completed its official vote count and proclaimed Marcos
president for another six years.10 Aquino rejected the official count,
proclaimed her own victory, and then called for a boycott of institutions and
services owned by Marcos or his cronies.11

7
See David A. Rosenberg, Introduction: Creating a “New Society”, in MARCOS AND MARTIAL
LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES 13-31 (David A. Rosenberg ed. 1979).
8
In response to Marcos’ announcement, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 (National
Law No. 883)which scheduled special national elections on February 7, 1986, for the offices of the
President and Vice-President of the Philippines. Several lawyers’ groups filed petitions before the Supreme
Court to question the constitutionality of the law. Five of the Justices voted to declare the law
unconstitutional. Inasmuch as there were less than the ten votes required to declare the law
unconstitutional, all the petitions were dismissed. See Philippine Bar Association v. Commission on
Elections, 140 SCRA 455-493 (1985).
9
Benigno Aquino returned to the Philippines in 1983 after three years to help the opposition
prepare for the coming congressional elections. He was assassinated minutes after arriving and being
placed under police custody. His death helped galvanized opposition to the Marcos regime.
10
This section is based on many accounts of the fall of the Marcos. See, e.g., LUCY KOMISAR,
CORAZON AQUINO: THE STORY OF A REVOLUTION 105-123 (1987); RAYMOND BONNER, WALTZING WITH
A DICTATOR: THE MARCOSES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN POLICY 385-440 (1988); STANLEY
KARNOW: IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA’S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 411-423 (1989); SANDRA BURTON,
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE MARCOSES, THE AQUINOS, AND THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1989); STERLING
SEAGRAVE, THE MARCOS DYNASTY (1990); PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE
POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 369-393 (2000).
11
DAVID WURFEL, FILIPINO POLITICS: DEVELOPMENT AND DECAY 300 (1998).
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At about the same time, Marcos uncovered a plot by some members
of the military to stage a coup d’etat by the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement. Fearing arrest, the plotters decided to retreat to Camp
Aguinaldo, the Defense Ministry headquarters. From there they announced
their break with the Marcos regime and appealed for protection from the
people.
People power began when civic and church leaders asked Filipinos to
provide a human shield to protect the military renegades from possible
reprisals from Marcos.12 People power was “the masses of Filipinos who
flooded the streets and held off Marcos’ tanks,”13 confident that the troops
would not shoot unarmed civilians and would instead listen to their appeals
for democracy. Marcos was forced from office in a unique event that
succeeded because civil society, the church, and the military coalesced
against the dictator.14 Thus, a revolt involving 250 disgruntled officers led
to a mass uprising by civilians who risked their own lives to protect the
soldiers.15 It was the culmination of a mass movement against the Marcos
regime already honed by years of protest into a disciplined, organized
movement.16
After Marcos was whisked away to Hawaii, Corazon Aquino was
proclaimed and sworn in as President in defiance of the Constitution. When
she took her oath of office she vowed to uphold “the fundamental law” and
to execute its “just laws.”17 She announced that her government was
revolutionary—taking power in the name of the people when she abolished
the National Legislature and replaced most of the members of the Supreme
12

BRYAN JOHNSON, FOUR DAYS OF COURAGE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE FALL OF MARCOS 76-82

(1987).
13
Janet L. Sawin, A Study of Peaceful Revolution: The Philippines, 1986, 17-WTR FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 181, 195 (1993).
14
Id. at 181; see also Kurt Schock, People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement
Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma, 46 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 355-371 (1999)
(discussing the broader political context of political opportunities and constraints that allowed for the
successful removal of Marcos).
15
Carl H. Landé, Introduction: Retrospect and Prospect, in REBUILDING A NATION: PHILIPPINE
CHALLENGES AND AMERICAN POLICY 7, 23 (Carl H. Landé, ed. 1987).
16
See MARK R. THOMPSON, The Puzzles of Philippine “People Power”, in DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTIONS: ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE 18, 27 (2003); see also William H. Overholt, The Rise and Fall
of Ferdinand Marcos, 26 ASIAN SURVEY 1137-1163 (1986). Overholt, suggests, however, that Aquino’s
people power revolution had less to do with the fall of the Marcos regime than the internal collapse of the
administration years earlier.
17
Joaquin G. Bernas, Who Is the President and by What Law?, in A LIVING CONSTITUTION: THE
AQUINO PRESIDENCY 2, 3 (2000). See also Mark Thompson, Off the Endangered List: Philippine
Democratization in Comparative Perspective, 28 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 179-205 (1996). Aquino issued
a proclamation declaring that her government was installed by the direct action of the people in defiance of
the provisions of the Constitution and that this extraordinary mandate required the complete reorganization
of the government. Id., at 187.
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Court.18
The reorganized Supreme Court recognized the Aquino
government as de jure,19 later referring to Aquino’s government as a
“revolutionary government.”20
B.

Repeat Performance

In the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada was elected President of the
Philippines with the largest margin of victory in Philippine history.21 His
presidency, however, was so shaken by scandals and allegations of
corruption22 that by October 2000, Estrada became the first Philippine
president to be impeached by Congress. His trial in the Senate followed
shortly.23
On January 16, 2001, Estrada’s supporters in the Senate blocked the
examination of documents that prosecutors claimed would prove Estrada
kept millions of dollars in secret bank accounts. Angered by the decision,
people took to the streets to demand Estrada’s resignation from office.
Members of the Estrada Cabinet resigned and the military and police brass
withdrew their support from the President. Shortly thereafter, President
Estrada left the Presidential Palace, paving the way for Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take the Presidential oath.24
Estrada challenged the legitimacy of the Arroyo government before
the Supreme Court but lost. The Court declared Arroyo’s administration de
18
Joaquin G. Bernas, Two Revolutions and Something Less, in A LIVING CONSTITUTION: THE
ABBREVIATED ESTRADA PRESIDENCY 13, 14 (2003).
19
Lawyer’s League for Better Philippines v. Aquino (G.R. No. 73748, 22 May 1986 [unpublished
resolution]) (declaring the Aquino administration a de jure government).
20
See Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589, 597 (1992). President Aquino
subsequently appointed a Constitutional Commission to draft a new charter for the Philippines, which was
ratified by the Filipino people on February 2, 1987. See Evardone v. Commission on Elections, 204 SCRA
464 (1991).
21
According to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Estrada garnered 42.1% of the votes
cast in the May 11, 1998 national elections. See NATIONAL STATISTICAL COORDINATING BOARD, NSCB
STATISTICS SERIES NO. 2001-002, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTRY’S ELECTORAL EXERCISES 7
(2001).
22
The allegations against Estrada involved unexplained wealth, cronyism and marital infidelity. See
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, INVESTIGATING ESTRADA: MILLIONS, MANSIONS AND
MISTRESSES (Sheila S. Coronel ed., 2000). Marcos and Estrada would later share the dubious distinction of
topping the list of the world’s most corrupt leaders, placing second and tenth respectively in a list prepared
by Transparency International. See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2004, press
release,
25
March
2004,
Regional
Highlights
page
1
of
7,
available
at
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/Highlights_from_the_GCR_2004_FINAL.pdf.
The Philippines is the only country with two leaders in the list.
23
For a summary of the events leading to the impeachment of Estrada, see Carl H. Landé, The
Return of “People Power” in the Philippines, 12:2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 88, 92-94 (2001).
24
Id., 95-96. See also James Putzel, A Muddled Democracy—”People Power” Philippine-Style,
Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series No. 00-14, November 2001, pp. 5-6.

FEBRUARY 2006

IT’S ALL THE RAGE

7

jure, but on grounds different than those they had used to legitimize the
Aquino administration:
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and
EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise
of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions.25
Not all the Justices were inclined to rhapsodize about the removal of
Estrada. Although there were no dissents in the decision, Justice YnaresSantiago expressed her discomfort with the impression that the Court was
sanctioning people power. Her opinion, excerpts of which are reproduced
here, is actually an indictment of people power. She wrote:
At the outset, I must stress that there is no specific provision in
the Constitution which sanctions “people power,” of the type
used at EDSA, as a legitimate means of ousting a public
official, let alone the President of the Republic. The framers of
the Constitution have wisely provided for the mechanisms of
elections, constitutional amendments, and impeachment as
valid modes of transferring power from one administration to
the other. Thus, in the event the removal of an incumbent
President or any government official from his office becomes
necessary, the remedy is to make use of these constitutional
methods and work within the system. To disregard these
constitutionally prescribed processes as nugatory and useless
instead of making them effectual is to admit that we lack
constitutional maturity.
She claimed that the Supreme Court itself was threatened with “mob action”
if it did not proclaim Arroyo as a de jure President.26
25
26

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 493 (2001).
353 SCRA 452, 569, 570, Ynares-Santiago concurring.
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Poor People Power

Months after he was removed from office, Estrada was charged with
the crime of plunder, an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death
under Philippine law.27 Estrada’s supporters camped outside the gates of his
house to prevent his arrest with many vowing they would die defending him.
Police took Estrada into custody after dispersing hundreds of supporters that
had gathered outside his home.28
Estrada’s arrest by hundreds of policemen and his treatment as a
common criminal won the sympathy of his supporters. Backed by local
churches, his supporters, who were mostly from urban poor communities,29
staged a massive demonstration at the EDSA shrine for several days to
express support for Estrada, agitating for his return to power. On May 1,
2001, egged on by politicians, the crowd marched to the presidential palace
and had to be dispersed the following day.30 The 50,000 strong crowd
armed with sticks and stones, Molotov bombs, and crudely made guns was
beaten back only after a twelve-hour battle with the police.31
On May 1, 2001, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region
and then directed the Armed Forces and the police to suppress the rebellion.
Arroyo lifted the declaration of the state of rebellion a few days later.32
D.

Small-Scale People Power

Facsimiles of people power continue to dot Philippine politics, but on
a smaller scale. Appointees of President Macapagal-Arroyo are being forced
out of office by protests led by government employee unions. Vitaliano
Nañagas was streamlining the Social Security System before he was ousted
from office. Secretary Raul Roco of the Department of Education and

27

Rep. Act No. 7080 (1991), amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993).
See Hope Ngo, Estrada Arrested, CNN.com/World, April 25, 2001, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/04/25/philippine.estrada.arrest.03/.
29
Vicente Rafael, The Cell Phone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in the Contemporary
Philippines, 15 PUBLIC CULTURE 399, 422-425 (2003).
30
Cesar Bacani & Raissa Espinosa-Robles, Mob power, ASIAWEEK, May 11, 2001, at 28-30.
31
Amando Doronila, THE FALL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA: THE INSIDE STORY 221 (2001).
32
Opposition leaders affected by the arrests challenged the constitutionality of Proclamation 38 but a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court believed the issue had become moot when President Arroyo
lifted the declaration a few days later. See Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757 (May 10,
2001).
28
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Commissioner Raul Bañez of the Bureau of Internal Revenue were likewise
instituting reforms when the employee unions forced them to resign.33
In a slightly different case, the Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes
resigned after he helped put down a one-day mutiny by members of the
military.34 On June 27, 2003, some 300 soldiers accused Reyes of
corruption and of using his position to fuel his political ambitions. The
soldiers demanded that he and President Arroyo resign in the wake of
mounting allegations of corruption and misuse of his position. The
Secretary resigned saying he wanted to spare the defense department from
attacks by his detractors.35
III.

THE CONTESTING VIEWS

A.

An Assault on Institutions

These popular uprisings are emotionally charged experiences. When
the dust clears, participants and observers alike try to make sense of the
event and rarely agree on what they see. The debates seem centered on the
similarities and differences between the removal of Presidents Marcos and
Estrada.
During the campaign for the 1986 presidential elections, Corazon
Aquino delivered a speech wherein she said, “My political program is
simple. I propose to dismantle the dictatorial edifice Marcos has built. In its
place I propose to build for our people a genuine democracy.”36 She
interpreted the removal of Marcos as a mandate to restore democracy in the
Philippines.37 Indeed, “redemocratization” was the “overarching principle”
of Aquino’s government.38 At the very least, the ouster of the Marcos
dictatorship restored formal democratic institutions including a presidential
form of government with a bicameral legislature.”39
33
Gemma B. Bagayaua, Union Power, NEWSBREAK, November 11, 2002, at 23. According to the
union, they filed a petition for the removal of Secretary Roco on the grounds of gross negligence, grave
misconduct, and incompetence. See Jet Damazo, Union Claims Victory, NEWSBREAK, September 16, 2002,
at 8.
34
Reyes resignation an act of sacrifice, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, August 31, 2003.
35
Id.
36
Corazon C. Aquino, Tearing Down the Dictatorship, Rebuilding Democracy, Address delivered
before the joint Rotary Clubs of Metro-Manila at the Manila Hotel, (January 23, 1986). Reproduced in
Corazon C. Aquino, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY AND PRAYER: SELECTED SPEECHES OF CORAZON C.
AQUINO 13-24 (1995).
37
See Carolina G. Hernandez, The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization 28 ASIAN
SURVEY 229-241 (1988).
38
Id., at 229.
39
See Julio Teehankee, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in ELECTORAL POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST
& EAST ASIA 149, 161 (Aurel Croissant ed., 2002).
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Estrada’s removal from office, however, was condemned, particularly by the
Western media, as an undemocratic and illegal removal of a democratically elected
leader. The removal was branded as a conspiracy hatched by business and political
leaders to force Estrada from what should be the exclusive enclave of the elite.40
Business leaders were allegedly eager to end the Estrada presidency because it was
pushing the country towards economic ruin.41 Others pointed out that Estrada’s
removal “was a de facto military coup, with only broad upper- and middle-class
support”42 led by “the opportunist coalition of church, business elite” and the defection
of the army brass.43 It was a “soft coup” engineered “to return the old, wealthy political
and business elite to power”44 and a victory for “mob rule.”45
Observers claim that Estrada’s ouster showed the weakness of Philippine-style
democracy and the general weakness of the Philippine state46 and further indicated that
there was still no democratic consolidation in the Philippines.47 The middle-class, said
one author, destabilized democracy in the name of “good governance.”48
Estrada said that his removal “irrevocably damaged the democratic institutions
that EDSA I restored in the 1986,”49 and that the process of changing duly-elected
leaders “may depend on the mob and a few fence-sitting and ambitious generals
breaking the chain of command at a crucial moment. Future leaders may be removed
by a noisy minority through rallies and street protests and the withdrawal of support by
the military.”50
40

See Peter Cordingley & Antonio Lopez, After the Gloria Euphoria, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 2, 2001, at

21.
41
For a summary of the Philippines’ economic performance under the Estrada Administration see
Mark L. Clifford, Not a moment too soon, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 5, 2001, at 16-19. See also Solita C.
Monsod, Mediocre by Empirical Findings, in PEOPLE POWER 2: LESSONS AND HOPES 207-208 (2001)
(discussing the deteriorating economic conditions under Estrada’s administration).
42
William H. Overholt, It’s ‘People Power’ Again, but this Time Without the People,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/8430.htm.
43
Philip Bowring, Filipino Democracy Needs Stronger Institutions, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2001, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/8219.htm.
44
Deidre Sheehan, More Power to the Powerful, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Feb. 1, 2001,
available at http://www.feer.com/_0102_01/p016region.html.
45
Anthony Spaeth, Oops, We Did It Again, TIME, Jan. 29, 2001, at 22. For a summary of Filipino
responses to these criticisms, see Seth Mydans, Expecting Praise, Filipinos are Criticized for Ouster, NEW
YORK TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001.
46
See Putzel, supra note 24.
47
Landé, supra note 23, at 100.
48
Mark R. Thompson, Pacific Asia After ‘Asian Values’: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and ‘Good
Governance,’ 25 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1079, 1090 (2004).
49
Joseph Estrada, “If This Can Be Done to Me, Who is Safe?” TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 9, 2001, ,
available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,99007,00.html.
50
Id. One author argues that the criticisms against the removal of Estrada reflect a misinterpretation
of events, by the neoliberal conception of democratic governance. This concept is more concerned with the
establishment of institutions that facilitate the operation of the market and has an ideological hostility
towards popular mobilization. See Ben Reid, The Philippine Democratic Uprising and the Contradictions
of Neoliberalism: EDSA II, 22:5 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 777, 788 (2001).
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In Defense of “Folk Democracy”

Those who instigated or benefited from the removal of Estrada, of
course, do not share these views. President Arroyo’s interpretation of her
mandate was that it was a “new lease in reclaiming our nation’s destiny
through a new opportunity at governance.”51 The contradiction in her
statement is palpable—a mandate grounded on good governance should
manifest fealty towards the rule of law. Instead, Arroyo’s assumption to
office disregarded the impeachment proceedings against Estrada and the
constitutional provisions on presidential succession.
But the removal of Estrada is often explained as a form of direct
democracy. People Power II was an exercise in direct democracy that
“kicked into motion once representative institutions began to check
systematic and massive abuse[s] of power.”52 The ouster of Estrada was not
exclusively an elite enterprise because the anti-Estrada coalition included the
organized left and organized labor—the lower classes exhibiting barely a
modicum of support for Estrada.53 According to one political analyst, it was
a “people’s coup”—a “democratic upheaval, driven by the people in their
exercise of their sovereign right to remove a leader who has failed them.”54
Those supporting the removal of Estrada have developed a thesis regarding
the propriety of their actions:
…[I]t was a popular movement that corrected the error of
having elected Estrada as President on a populist platform. In
People Power II, the people acted to halt the devastation
inflicted by the Estrada presidency, through its incompetence
and venalities, on the economy, the political institutions and the
presidency, which suffered its worst degradation during the
Estrada administration.55
According to this thesis, the demonstrations that forced Estrada from office
were “an eloquent protest against the country’s fractured institutions, and

51

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Address at the 15th Anniversary of EDSA II (sic), delivered
at the People Power Monument, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Quezon City. (February 25, 2001).
available at http://www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/speech-2001feb25.htm.
52
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forcefully asserted popular anger over the blatant corruption of democratic
principles and processes.”56
Former President Fidel V. Ramos claims that people power “is an
assertion of the sovereign people’s ultimate right to intervene—when
political institutions fail—to undertake a last effort to make democracy work
the way it should.”57 It is an attempt to restore an “invisible institution of
morality” which he claims is the “true foundation of the rule of law.”58
Ramos opines that Philippine-style democracy entitles the people to
use both direct (extralegal means) and indirect (legal) forms of exercising
popular sovereignty so that when the indirect mechanisms do not function
properly, recourse to direct mechanisms like people power are necessary.
EDSA II, in this view, was the only viable alternative left after what a
critical mass of people thought to be a premature end of the impeachment
trial of then-President Estrada. According to this view, EDSA II embodied
the collective will and action of a critical mass that ultimately ousted a
leader charged with cronyism and corruption.59 Estrada’s removal from
office was a “large-scale collective action in the wake of a failed formal
mechanism (the impeachment process) [which] turned public opinion,
forcing a mass resignation of the cabinet and the effective resignation of the
president.”60 This view concludes that People Power II did not weaken
Philippine democracy but strengthened it, giving Filipinos an opportunity to
reform their government and work for the common good. EDSA II was
another “chance to reform [Philippine] ‘electoral democracy’ and seriously
bring about ‘substantive democracy.’”61
C.

An Attempted Putsch?

The debate about Estrada’s removal was compounded when his
supporters gathered at EDSA to call for his return to the presidency. This
event, EDSA III, remains largely ignored by analysts and in many cases,
56
See Emmanuel S. de Dios & Paul D. Hutchcroft, Political Economy, in THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY:
DEVELOPMENT, POLICIES, AND CHALLENGES 45, 64 (Arsenio Balisacan & Hal Hill eds., 2003).
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59
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available accounts are limited to descriptions of violence, fueling the view
that it was a mob that gathered in support of Estrada.62 When EDSA III is
mentioned at all, it is disparaged as “the attack on Malacañang palace . . . by
mobs incited by political allies of deposed President Estrada . . . .”63 It was
“a prolonged rally” that “ended in a bloody, riotous attack on the presidential
palace.”64
These accounts make no distinction between the nonviolent protests at
the EDSA shrine and the subsequent attack on the presidential palace. This
omission is significant because only a small fraction of those who were at
EDSA actually marched to Malacañang Palace. As such, the accounts of
this uprising are hostile, and distinguished from the accounts of the prior
uprisings involving the removal of Presidents Marcos and Estrada. The
following excerpts are characteristic of this treatment:
It is important to distinguish the May 1 street protest from the
two previous “People Power” upheavals. The appropriation of
“People Power” by Estrada’s supporters was a malevolent
attempt to convey the impression that they were carrying out a
genuine people’s revolt against a usurper, in this case President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. But this crowd had a frenzied
quality, with enraged mobsters charging the beleaguered police,
and cabal plotters inciting the crowd to violence. . .
....
The most disturbing aspect were reports that many
protesters were paid up to 1,000 pesos ($20) a day to lay siege
to Malacanang. They were rounded up from impoverished
squatter communities by mayors sympathetic to Estrada. A
thousand pesos can feed a poor family for a week. It is no
different from the routine vote-buying during election
campaigns. . . . 65

62
See Rage on the Streets, THE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING MAG, Apr.-June 2001, at 21-25. One
such account listed the injuries sustained by members of the press from irate Estrada supporters. See
Evelyn O. Katigbak, Erap supporters decry “media bias” Look Who’s Talking, 12 PHILIPPINE JOURNALISM
REV. 26, 26-27 (2001). The list of injuries was intended to show the Estrada supporters’ hostility towards
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64
Paul D. Hutchcroft & Joel Rocamora, Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and
Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines, 3 J. OF E. ASIAN STUD. 259, 282 (2003).
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In short, the mainly middle-class forces behind EDSA II refused to
include the “May Day Riots” in the people power tradition, claiming that it
lacked moral clarity, and that it was violent and largely orchestrated by proEstrada forces carting people from the provinces or inducing them to
participate with money, food and even drugs.66
Most accounts patronize the participants as the pawns of vested
interests or “mainly motivated by resentments against the rich, by feelings
that a terrible injustice had been done to their hero…by a sense that they
were acting to protect the constitution and democracy.”67 The third uprising
at EDSA, said one political scientist, was a “powerful warning that the
nation’s poor, once sufficiently empowered, may finally rise against a
society and political system they judge to be hopelessly unjust and
oppressive.”68
All of a sudden, people were having second thoughts about the
wisdom of people power. The removal of Joseph Estrada and the storming
of the presidential residence by pro-Estrada groups are leading people to
think that “not only is people power becoming a habit in making political
change but also its overuse is dangerous to democracy and political
stability.”69
Disagreement over the nature and use of people power is rising; this is
evident in public opinion surveys. A survey conducted by the Social
Weather Stations70 in February 2001 showed that 71% of the respondents
believed that People Power II was “the sentiment of the majority” compared
to 28% who believed that it was the sentiment of a few.71 The survey also
showed that 61% of the respondents expressed the view that Estrada’s
removal was “just” and 59% went so far as to say that it was the “will of
God.”72 Another survey conducted by the University of the Philippines
Center for Leadership, Citizenship and Democracy conducted in November
2001 showed that 77% of the respondents agreed that the removal of Marcos
66
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in 1986 was “true people power.”73 However, only 57% of the respondents
agreed that the forced resignation of Estrada was “people power,” and only
30% believed that the pro-Estrada gathering at EDSA was people power.74
D.

Cabinet Resignations

The latest incarnations of people power in the Philippines were carried
out to force the resignations of members of the Arroyo cabinet. This recent
permutation of people power has even fewer supporters, and it is often
described as “rule by the rabble,”75 a grotesque form of people power
unleashed to pressure government institutions such as the Commission on
Elections (in the case of the disqualification of party-list organizations) and
the Supreme Court (in the case of its decision over the legitimacy of the
Arroyo administration). The removal of members of the Cabinet fuels
contempt for people power because it allegedly forces public officials to
abdicate governance to accommodate the demands of interest groups. 76
The sociologist Randolph David explains, however, that these
instances are not reasons to regret or fear people power. In his view, a
people inspired by the effectiveness of direct collective action as a political
weapon will now challenge the old routines of stable bureaucracies.77
Indeed, it is David, more than anyone else, who has demonstrated
unwavering faith in people power.
IV.

DAVID’S THEORY OF PEOPLE POWER

Randolph David has made the greatest efforts at defining the
parameters of people power. In various pieces throughout the years he has
presented his ideas on what constitutes a genuine exercise of that power.
People power, he points out, does not exist in the vocabulary of either social
theory or political theory—so he presents his own definition:
In empirical terms, what we have come to call people power is,
first of all, a large public gathering of unarmed people united
by a set of common political calls.
Secondly, it is a political gathering in the sense that its
objectives are ultimately concerned with political power, even
73
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though it remains largely non-violent and unarmed, and may at
times even assume a religious form.
Thirdly, this massive gathering of people usually in a
symbolic place is sustained over a couple of days, with the
crowd growing in size, density and fervor day by day.
Fourthly, a variety of activities ranging from speeches,
singing, dancing, and religious rituals keep the participants
cheerfully engaged. These activities are characterized by a
spontaneous outpouring of warmth and generosity among the
members of the crowd, creating a social leveling or equalizing
effect on the participants.
Lastly, people power is amorphous; it follows no definite
timetable, has no definable organization or leadership, and
follows no predetermined direction. Its main concern is to
increase its numbers from day to day. It knows when it has
attained its peak; the collective excitement reaches a crescendo,
and the crowd eagerly awaits its moment of final discharge and
triumph.78
Curiously, this definition seems more concerned with form (location and
size) and fuzzy feelings. David seems to be crafting a definition that would
exclude the pro-Estrada rallies from any discussion of people power by
focusing on a warmth and generosity that the pro-Estrada rallies allegedly
lacked, at least insofar as they were depicted by the media. This is not the
only occasion on which David tried to remove EDSA III from people power
discourse. On another, he wrote:
Real people power is autonomous, self-willed, and well
informed. It draws its courage and determination from the
power of its convictions. It is inventive and free, and not
constrained by dogma, political correctness or any party line. It
is moral protest elevated to an art. It is not awed by power. It
stands up to power, but it disdains power. That is why it has no
leaders, only symbols. It clothes itself in the symbols of
everything that is good, decent, and responsible.
78
Randolf S. David, People Power and the Legal System: A Sociological Note, in REFLECTIONS ON
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It is unarmed, non-violent, and highly disciplined. It is
militant but never sad. Indeed it is festive and celebratory. It is
angry at times, but never aggressive. It does not only claim the
high moral ground, but it also regards itself as the force of the
new, the vanguard of a hopeful future. Oppressive, morally
bankrupt, and corrupt regimes are its principal targets.
....
The crowds that are mobilized and prompted to sing
praises for someone already in power do not constitute people
power. People power is never sycophantic. While it fights
tyrants and corrupt leaders, it studiously avoids being used for
narrow political ends. And herein lies its paradoxical strength:
people power is a political weapon with political ends; yet it
resolutely rejects political ambition.79
David also adopts the view that people power compensates for the defects of
Western political systems that were implanted in the Philippines. He views
people power as “a means of correcting the major dysfunctional
consequences of borrowed institutions.”80 It is a tool “far more effective
than piecemeal pressure politics and far more powerful than amending a
constitution.”81 Rather, it is a safety valve that can be released when the
implanted foreign institutions fail—the back-up system that accommodates
unanticipated episodes in political life. As such, EDSA II was the result of a
movement—consisting of “the young, the middle class, and the educated
sectors of society who refused to be led any further by an inept, corrupt, and
archaic President”—to restore accountability and idealism in government.82
David thus interprets people power as an application of this emergency
measure. He gives EDSA II, in particular, a new sheen:
EDSA II is this generation’s urgent plea to reorganize
ourselves, update our institutions, develop our human
resources, and re-dedicate ourselves to our heroes’ dream of an
independent and confident nation before the imperatives of
capitalist globalization overtake and drown us. Today we know
that this cannot be achieved under a national leadership that
79
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governs the nation as if it is business as usual. It is clear that
we can no longer afford to drift, because even if we don’t
drown, we would be swept by the tide to an isolated corner,
there to wallow in our insecurities and irrelevant resentments.83
Consistent with
demonstrations:

this

template,

David

disparages

the

pro-Estrada

This is not people power; this is its parody, its farcical version.
People power is moved by hope; the so-called “EDSA III” is
burdened by despair. People power imagines what life can be if
people placed their destiny in their hands. This one imagines
what life would have been if their patron had not been
overthrown. People power desires to move on and remake the
world; people resentment desires to dwell in the past and
display its wounds.84
There are certain elements, David explains, that should be present before a
massive gathering can qualify as genuine people power. To be genuine, it
must have the sympathy of the larger society (schools, mass media, churches
professional, and business organizations).85
David’s views seem skewed to discredit any uprising that deviates
from the goals laid down by the anti-Estrada groups. The genuine exercise
of people power as David defines it should approximate the goals and
techniques of the uprising that removed Estrada from office.
Even if one accepts David’s definition, it may yet be argued that the
Estrada rallies still qualify as people power. Were the pro-Estrada rallies
any less festive? Were they any less charged with hope? Were they not
protests against the perceived usurpation of the office of the president?
In the quest to answer questions regarding the nature of genuine
people power, we ask the wrong questions when we try to fit the subsequent
events into the template of the 1986 uprising. From this view, only the
removal of Marcos is genuine. The removal of Estrada is contested. The
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attempted removal of President Arroyo is branded as a parody, a farce, and
even an obscene “bastardized version” of people power.86
This myopic approach to discussing popular uprisings disables us
from understanding why they happen at all. We keep ourselves from
knowing why the vaunted “people power revolution” of 1986 failed to bring
genuine democracy to the Philippines. Instead, the inquiry should be
reoriented to accommodate alternative views of people power so that the
definition encompasses all popular uprisings.
V.

TWO MORE VIEWS

The events that ended the Marcos regime revived the promise of
democracy and prompted speculation of similar uprisings in other
authoritarian states.87 These events put the Philippines at the crest of the
“third wave of democratization”88 and political protests, such as those
directed at Marcos, are identified as among the significant factors
contributing to democratization in Asia.89
Recently, however, the “transition paradigm”—the belief that a
country’s move away from authoritarian rule is a move toward democracy—
has come under serious scrutiny. Analysts have pointed out that many
countries in a “transitional” state are not in transition to democracy and
claim that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness.90 The political
trajectories of most third-wave countries bring into question the very core
assumptions of the transition paradigm.91
The United Nations Development Programme aired a similar concern.
There are presently more democratic countries and more political
participation than ever. There are 147 countries holding multi-party
elections, 121 of which had some or all of the elements of formal democracy
in 2000, an increase from fifty-four countries in 1980.92 Of the eighty-one
countries that took steps towards democratization, however, only forty-seven
are considered by the UN to be full democracies, while others do not seem to
86
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be in transition to democracy.93 Rather than a wave of democracy, there
seems to be an unprecedented increase in the rise of “pseudodemocracies”—
regimes that are “neither clearly democratic nor conventionally
authoritarian.”94
A.

People Power as One Stage in the Process of Democratization

The removals of Marcos and Estrada excited students of Philippine
politics with hopes of potential strengthening of democracy and quickening
of democratization. Subsequent events, however, have so far disappointed
those hopes. The Aquino government made modest changes towards
democracy and not a “…decisive reform of iniquitous social structures...”95
Philippine democracy after Marcos remained “shallow and fragile.”96 While
the ouster of Marcos encouraged civil society to flourish, traditional actors
in political society have used their positions of power to stifle the
participation of civil society.97 Moreover, instead of leading to the creation
of a more democratic system,98 recent surveys indicate that Filipinos are
dissatisfied with democracy.99
Much of the frustration over people power is a product of the failed
hopes that it initially inspired. Even assuming that both the Marcos and
Estrada removals were genuine exercises of people power, neither event
accomplished the social transformation it purported to trigger.100 The
aftermath of EDSA I was anything but revolutionary. Rather, it “paved the
way for the return of the old system of elite democracy that Marcos’ martial
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law had tried to bury.”101 David explains that because political power
remained in the hands of the elite, the energy of People Power I “was
quickly contained and placed at the disposal of conservative forces.”102 The
rage underpinning EDSA II was extinguished at an even earlier stage. The
elite, after its capture of the state apparatus, urged the need for stability of
the political system and, far from carrying out any mandate of reform,
simply rebooted the system with a different cast of characters at the
country’s helm.
Three years later, the Philippine press declared EDSA II as another
failure because “[t]he business of government and politics is still being
conducted, not on the basis of principles, but on the basis of pragmatism,
practicality and self-interest.”103 The Catholic Church agreed saying that the
gains of people power had already been squandered,104 as the forces
responsible for the fall of Estrada drifted apart.105
The disappointment is inevitable because we exaggerate expectations
from people power. If the fall of Marcos is a “democratic uprising”—
defined as a “spontaneous popular uprising . . . which topple[s] unyielding
dictators and begin[s] a transition process that eventually results in the
consolidation of democracy”106—then people power can only disappoint. If
one regards the fall of Estrada as the result of a crusade against corruption,
the disappointment is magnified yet again.
In essence, people power is an expression of outrage against assaults
on the integrity of the political system. This was true when Marcos used an
election to cloak his administration with a veil of legitimacy, and when
Estrada’s allies in the Senate blocked access to records that would reveal the
extent of his personal wealth during his impeachment trial. In both cases,
the formal institutions of government were abused; resort to an alternative
was inevitable.
As an expression of rage, people power has inherent limitations. First,
the rage is expended almost as soon as it becomes manifest. It does not
purport to lay out a plan for institutional or moral changes in Philippine
politics and society. As one journalist who analyzed the removal of Estrada
101
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put it, “No one who came to [EDSA] on the night of January 16 had any idea
what he would do there, except to be with kindred spirits and weep for our
country and our children.”107 Second, it builds on a consensus for change
only insofar as the incumbent officials are challenged to resign. The fiesta is
directed at the removal of an individual. In 1986, the Marcos administration
was replaced by those believed to have won the elections. In 2001, the vicepresident of the country replaced Estrada.
Because it is temporary, people power does not claim to initiate
structural reform. It is a declaration of outrage that dissipates when the
immediate issue is addressed. It gives hope but cannot provide a blueprint
for reform. The political processes are, therefore, left vulnerable to
predation. People power may be triggered by the ideal of justice, but it
cannot see beyond its own rage and—it lacks the vision of reform.
Wandering aimlessly, it is easily hijacked by remnants of the state.
Although reassembly or control of the state apparatus falls to those
who succeed in disassembling the state, the overriding concern turns very
quickly turns to political stability, and thus the players drift towards
restoration, and not revolution. Their anger spent, the people realize the
potential dangers of their actions and instinctively rebuild the system that
they helped take apart. It is little wonder then that, after the dismemberment
of the Marcos political apparatus, the Filipinos built a government
resembling much of the pre-martial law structures that the dictator himself
destroyed.108 After Marcos, Filipinos restored the structures of Western
democracy but could not alter the inequities in society.109 This is also true
for the removal of Estrada—nothing revolutionary in the government
structure or personnel emerged after the President was removed.
People power defies the State insofar as it challenges the incumbent to
resign. It carries with it so much potential for social reconstruction that it is
distrusted and quickly contained by the political and economic elite. This is
possibly why, despite ending both the Marcos and Estrada administrations,
Filipinos lament the reconsolidation of elite power. People power is not a
revolution so there is no apparent need to restructure the state to address
107
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social ills or make the system more democratic. It carries so much of the old
order that it will rebuild itself in the image and likeness of its predecessor.
This is not to suggest that popular uprisings cannot lead to
democratization; they do provide a temporary opening that can allow for
such revolutionary changes. People power can create an environment for
policy change only while traces of rage still linger in the air. Philippine
sociologist Raul Pertierra classifies both the ousters of Marcos and Estrada
as instances of comunitas, which is the suspension or reversal of societal
bonds.110 Under comunitas, social hierarchies are suspended thereby
providing an opening for radical changes. Unless this opening is exploited,
the old structures will escape transformation.111 As explained above, this is
the reason why conservative forces quickly contain the space for
revolutionary changes created by people power.
If people power is a form of democratic revolution, only Marcos’
removal will qualify as genuine people power. The removal of Estrada does
not even pretend to be about strengthening democracy or making the
political system more democratic. It was designed to remove a single
individual from office. There was no overhaul of an ailing system; instead it
invoked the Constitution to justify the assumption of Gloria MacapagalArroyo to office.
Nor can the attempted removal of President Arroyo claim any
semblance to uprisings aimed at furthering democracy because it was
triggered as a protest against the arrest of Estrada. Ironically, the trigger for
EDSA III was actually an attempt on the part of the government to follow
the rule of law, by arresting an accused to stand trial for the crimes of which
he was charged. The number of people who attended the pro-Estrada
demonstrations cannot change the fact that this gathering at EDSA was
designed to restore a person to power. In any case, the violent march to the
presidential palace instantly disqualifies the pro-Estrada demonstrations
from the list of “genuine” exercises of people power. Likewise, every other
use of people power to remove members of the cabinet will be a farce
insofar as their purpose is to protest policies and/or personalities.
In short, the account of people power as a form of democratic uprising
leads to dissatisfaction with its results, because ultimately the Philippines
remains in the clutches of “elite democracy.” This account also precludes
the possibility of appreciating any other massive uprising as a “genuine”
people power because the conditions that led to the ouster of Marcos in 1986
110
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111
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can never be replicated. However, if we instead viewed it as less than a
revolution, we could begin to ask why democracy has not yet consolidated in
the Philippines so that we could address these issues. With this perspective,
we could strive to find an explanation as to why democracy has not been
consolidated instead of wallowing in its failure.
B.

People Power as a Declaration of Allegiance

There is another way of viewing the people power phenomenon, one
that has little to do with democracy or democratization. On this view, the
participants of the first people power uprising did not gather at EDSA in
defiance of an authoritarian regime, but because they were outraged at the
manner in which Marcos stole an election to further entrench himself in
power. The final assault on his hold on power was not a revolt against his
authoritarian regime; the people power uprising would have occurred even if
the Philippines had been a democracy at that time. Rather than a
“revolution,” the uprising may be described as a shift of allegiance away
from Marcos or as a popular vote of no-confidence.
Many of those who opposed the Marcos regime did not hold strong
beliefs in democratic ideals.112 Some were simply excluded from Marcos’s
system of crony capitalism or were more concerned with the communist
insurgency than the restoration of electoral democracy.113 Yet, we associate
the fall of Marcos with democratization because his regime was in fact
authoritarian; and more importantly, because it coincided with the fall of
many other authoritarian regimes throughout the world. The temptation to
cluster these events together as the third wave of democratization becomes
irresistible.
On the alternative view here considered, an attempt to dislodge an
incumbent official qualifies as a genuine exercise of people power,
regardless of whether the attempt is successful or not. People power thus
described is no less profound. That a people can band together peacefully to
force a chief executive from office makes the event astounding. There is
nothing intrinsically bad about collective effort to remove a person from
office. Officials can be pressured to, and sometimes, do resign. These
pressured resignations do not constitute departures from “rule of law” or
democratic constitutionalism. Fixed terms of office are not guarantees of
tenure; they do not guarantee an elected official a minimum number of years
112
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in office but they do set a maximum. That the political atmosphere could
dictate a shorter tenure for a public official is an unwritten rule of politics.
The view that people power simultaneously challenges the legitimacy
of an incumbent and favors another person with allegiance precludes
questions into whether an attempt at people power is genuine. Because it is
a declaration of allegiance, it is neither right nor wrong. The only inquiry to
be made is whether the official succumbs to such displays of defiance. The
outcome is determined by, among other things, the mettle of the official and
the magnitude of support for those challenging his or her rule.114
The removals of Marcos and Estrada fit this description. Marcos’
departure was finally guaranteed by the United State’s withdrawal of
support. In Estrada’s case, the people—those present at EDSA—declared
their withdrawal of support for the President. When most of his cabinet and
the military also withdrew their support for Estrada, he left the palace and
then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became President by
operation of the Constitution.
In this sense, even the pro-Estrada rallies—until they degenerated into
an attack on the presidential palace—are also manifestations of people
power. They, too, were triggered by outrage at the manner in which the
former President was arrested. They, too, challenged the legitimacy of the
Arroyo Administration and sought the restoration of Estrada to power.
Politicians may have twisted the demonstrations or whipped up the
participants into a frenzy but these are irrelevant. The demonstrations were
still a declaration of allegiance for Estrada, and a challenge to the legitimacy
of the present administration.
All the other pocket versions of people power, however, still lack the
moral outrage that correctly triggers people power. They seem to be
designed to block efforts at reforms that would put their jobs at stake or
disingenuous attempts to invoke people power for narrow political ends.
Other recent developments in the Philippines support the view that
people power is a “pledge of allegiance” in favor of a particular leader.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ran for reelection in the national
elections of May 2004.115 The opposition coalition fielded former movie
actor Fernando Poe, Jr. as its candidate. Poe built his career on a string of
action movies that generated legions of fans. But while his popularity is
114
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incontestable, his citizenship was not. Born of Spanish and American
parents, there was some question whether Poe satisfied the citizenship
requirement of the Philippine presidency.116
Petitions for the
disqualification of Poe were filed with the Commission on Elections and the
issue ultimately reached the Philippine Supreme Court.117 Throughout these
unsuccessful efforts, Poe’s supporters warned “they would take to the
streets” if the candidate was disqualified by the Commission on Elections118
and even warned of “a potential revolt.”119 Former President Estrada, a
friend of Poe, warned the Supreme Court not to disqualify Poe: “I’m
warning them not to do that, lest there will be civil war, revolution or
massive civil disobedience . . . .”120
Poe’s supporters made a declaration of allegiance and a threat of
collective action, regardless of whether he was qualified to run for President.
These warnings are interesting because they verify the view that people
power is not about democracy. These statements are an affirmation of the
view that, beyond formal legal and democratic institutions of the Philippine
State, there are forces that can be summoned to support a preferred leader.
These calls for people power are taken seriously. Weeks after the
election when the results were not yet officially determined, President
Arroyo congratulated the Filipinos for successfully exercising their right to
vote in a relatively peaceful and seemingly credible election. In her first
public appearance after the elections, she said, “We started this journey
when we brought back democracy to our people through the power of the
ballot and no longer in the streets.”121
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President Arroyo’s statement was less about praising the Filipinos for
conducting elections peacefully, and more of a plea to refrain from
subjecting her tenuous mandate to the more exacting standards of people
power. To be sure, however, Arroyo’s supporters are also threatening to
unseat Poe through massive protests if he is declared the winner.122 This
pledge of allegiance is evidently made on both sides of the election trail.
C.

Implications for Research

Looking at people power as a democratic revolution123 denies the
reality that it is merely a short-lived and shortsighted outburst of rage.
Revolutions are guided by the idea of an alternative regime to replace the
existing one. Revolutions follow a plan; people power does not do more
than call for a resignation of a public official. The uprising against Marcos
sought to honor the results of an election, not initiate fundamental social
change. It was a largely urban and middle-class event that could qualify as a
nonviolent revolt or nonviolent coup at best.124 Many observers and scholars
assumed that overthrowing the Marcos regime would lead to the
consolidation of democracy and were disappointed that it did not. We
magnify our disappointment by ascribing authorship of these events to
divine intervention.
The alternatives presented here should steer scholarship in another
direction. The Philippines has been in the process of democratization for
more than a century,125 and the fall of Marcos is a single episode in that
history. Marcos’ departure from the presidential palace returned the
Philippines to 1972, when it was in the grip of elite democracy.126 While the
removal of the dictator was a significant gain in struggle towards
democratization, it did not necessarily lead to a transition to democracy. In
fact, others charge, it restored elite democracy.127
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Today, government is becoming even less representative of the
people. A member of the post-Marcos Congress is typically male, middleaged, and college-educated. He is likely to have held local government
office, and had a sibling, father, or grandfather who has also held public
office.128 He has multiple sources of income and a net worth, estimated
conservatively, of 10 million pesos.129 He is hardly representative of the
typical Filipino.
To insist on framing people power as a democratic revolution can
only lead to complaints about its failure to consolidate democracy in the
Philippines. If we resist the temptation of locking people power onto
democratization, then we can begin to look at it from other perspectives. For
instance, we could demonstrate, as others have, that the failure of democratic
consolidation is attributable in part to the reconsolidation of elite control,130
or to other factors such as male chauvinism.131
The fall of Marcos could also be viewed as a form of non-violent
action. It involves “activity in the collective pursuit of social or political
objectives and does not involve physical force or the threat of physical force
against human beings.”132 Schock explains that:
Nonviolent action occurs through: (1) acts of omission,
whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms,
custom, law, or decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people
perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not
expected by norms or customs to perform, or are forbidden by
law, regulation, or decree to perform; or (3) a combination of
acts of omission and commission.133
The removals of Marcos and Estrada and the attempted removal of
Arroyo fall neatly into these definitions. While people power can be
understood as a species of nonviolent action, it is not necessarily a
democratic revolution.
Incarnations of people power are nonviolent acts. This is clearly true
for the removal of Marcos and Estrada. The protest against Estrada’s arrest
and the agitation for his return to power was also a nonviolent protest; it,
128
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too, was people power in that it was a manifestation of allegiance to Estrada,
at least until the crowds marched to the presidential palace. These acts
deserve study not necessarily as a strategy for democratization, but as
instances of a form of nonviolent protest—triggered by outrage and directed
specifically at the removal of an official.
We could also ask if people power is a form of popular
constitutionalism. Although vaguely defined,134 removing public officials
through massive protests could be what Tushnet referred to as “a law
oriented to realizing the principles of the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution’s preamble.”135 In both successful attempts at removing
their presidents, Filipinos could simply have been implementing the
principles that are embedded in their Constitution as they understood it. 136
As Kramer suggests, popular constitutionalism “assign[s] ordinary
citizens a central and pivotal role in implementing their Constitution” and
vests the “final interpretative authority . . . with the people themselves.”137
On this view, popular constitutionalism allows citizens and political leaders
to assert their interpretations of the Constitution on serious constitutional
issues. When there are no major controversies facing society, citizens and
political leaders are content to let the Supreme Court’s rulings go
unchallenged. However, whenever circumstances compel Americans to
crystallize their latent beliefs and choose sides, they consistently choose
popular constitutionalism over the view that the Constitution is subject to
authoritative control by the judiciary.138
Is this not what Filipinos do when they intervene in the political
processes? Is it possible that people power is the Filipinos’ way of declaring
what the law should be on a particular political issue? Is it the people’s
attempt at interpreting the Constitution?
These alternative approaches should caution us against judging the
Filipinos’ penchant for replacing their leaders as nothing more than mob
rule. Criticisms against “extra-constitutional” methods of removing public
officials in the Philippines are misplaced because nonviolent demonstrations
are not alien to democracies or to constitutionalism. Indeed, they are
guaranteed by the Constitution.139 Public officers may be called on to
account for their actions or to resign. That public officials actually leave
134
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office cannot make popular pressure for their resignation undemocratic.
These popular uprisings are, at their core, a reflection of adherence to
democratic principles. We should look at people power not as a gauge of the
political immaturity of Filipinos but as an indication of their willingness to
reiterate the values that are enshrined in their Constitution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the 2004 presidential elections, the incumbent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo defeated the popular movie star Fernando Poe, Jr., by a
little more than a million votes.140 In her inaugural address, the President
found it necessary to refer to the potential threat of another popular uprising.
She hoped that:
The divisive issues generated by EDSA [I], [II,] and [III] will
also be just memories shared by friends from every side in
those upheavals. Only the lessons of unity, courage and a just
closure kept alive in their hearts.
We must end with justice the conflict brought about by
EDSA [I], [II] and [III]. There are more things that bind rather
than tear us apart as a nation. We are a vibrant country with a
lively democracy and fervor burning in our hearts. Industry,
patience, fear of God and love for family are common values
we hold dear.141
Arroyo is evidently hoping to extinguish the phenomenon that helped put her
in power three years earlier.
The views on Philippine people power phenomenon have changed
over the years; it is scarcely remembered as part of the wave of
democratization that swept across the world. Instead, recent versions of the
phenomenon have prompted observers to become wary of the way it can be
used to by-pass constitutional rules on succession. This caution raises
questions in turn on the legitimacy of governments that assume power
through people power. It invites instability today where it used to inspire
hope.
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This article attempts to redirect the discussion on people power by reimagining the phenomenon as distinct from democratic revolution. It cannot
be considered as a revolution because it preserves so much of the old order
that it is unable to initiate and sustain structural or policy changes. This
failure to produce change is the reason that Filipinos lament the restoration
of the pre-Marcos forces to power so quickly after the dictator was
dramatically deposed.
Instead, people power should be seen as an expression of outrage and
not a blueprint for structural change. It is an objection against an act by
representatives of the State or a declaration of allegiance in favor of a
particular person. The force by which this objection is made is so powerful
that it dislodged a dictatorship and an incompetent administration.
To view people power as a catalyst for democratization can only lead
to disappointment when the substance of Philippine democracy is assessed.
Instead, students of this phenomenon should view it either as a significant
step towards democratization, or as a form of protest that has little to do with
democratization. Either way, we may now ask the right questions about the
state of democratization in the Philippines instead of bemoaning the
Filipinos’ proclivities toward extra-constitutional remedies.
VII. EPILOGUE: THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE?
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo beat movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. in the
presidential elections on May 10, 2004, in part because of the opposition’s
failure to unite under a single candidate. The official tally showed that
Arroyo won 40% of the vote with Poe following closely with 36.5%.142
The opposition contested the official results of the elections. In
separate petitions, Poe and his vice-presidential candidate, Loren Leagarda,
filed election protests with the Supreme Court (which sits as a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) to annul Congress’ proclamation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Vice President Noli de Castro as the winners of the
elections.143 Months later, however, Poe lapsed into a coma144 and died
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shortly thereafter.145 The Supreme Court later dismissed Poe’s electoral
protest.146
Despite his death, Poe’s supporters said that they would “do anything
to unseat President Arroyo, including waging another people power on
EDSA.”147 Poe’s supporters said they would entrust the next administration
to Poe’s widow, Susan Roces. They said that they would not wait until 2010
when Arroyo’s six-year term ends, adding that, “There is no other way to
replace Mrs. Arroyo but people power. The Constitution does not allow the
holding of snap election[s].”148
These statements stress two important points. First, people power is
always an option that can be exercised in Philippine politics against
incumbent officials. Second, Poe’s supporters acknowledge the existence of
the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, but may employ mass protests
to oust the incumbent President.
The irony is inescapable. Careful not to offend the Constitution by
insisting on an unscheduled election, Arroyo’s detractors say they will push
her out the door instead. Despite criticisms of the use of people power,
Filipinos have evidently managed to reconcile it with the idea of
constitutionalism.
Things, however, have been taking a turn for the worse for the
President. Arroyo is already the Philippines’ most unpopular president in
the post-Marcos era. Her satisfaction ratings plummeted to minus fourteen
in March 2003, after she decided to join the US war in Iraq. Her ratings
were at minus twelve in March 2005, because of rising inflation and
economic difficulties.149 In May 2005 Arroyo’s performance rating fell to
its lowest ever, to minus thirty-three.150 Even Joseph Estrada enjoyed a plus
nine rating at the height of his impeachment proceeding in December
2000.151
To make matters worse, a congressional investigation on illegal
gambling produced witnesses implicating members of Arroyo’s family.
Thereafter, recordings of phone conversations between the President and
Commissioner Virgilio Garcilliano of the Commission on Elections during
the height of the 2004 presidential elections triggered calls for her
145
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resignation.152 There are three hours of taped conversations that suggest
attempts on the part of the President to manipulate the results of the
elections.153
The President’s response to the crisis was disappointing. She initially
refused to comment on the tape. She then delivered a message on television
admitting that it was her voice on the tape, and apologized for what she
called “a lapse of judgment.”154 She hoped that her apology would stop the
increasing calls for her resignation.155 Refusing to acknowledge any
wrongdoing on her part, Arroyo blamed everyone else for the present crisis.
She blamed members of her family and sent them away.156 She blamed her
cabinet and asked its members to resign.157 She blamed the political system
and called for the revision of the Constitution and a shift to a parliamentary
and federal form of government.158
Survey after survey shows the President’s eroding support. A large
majority of Filipinos, according to one survey, believe that the Philippines
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The author reproduced and translated one of the conversations. The most damning excerpt is
reproduced below:
GMA: Hello?
GMA: Hello?
Garcillano: Hello, ma’am, good morning. Ok
Garcillano: Hello, ma’am, good morning. Ok
ma’am, mas mataas ho siya pero mag-compensate ma’am, he has more votes but we will be able to
compensate for this in Lanao.
ho sa Lanao yan.
GMA: So will I still lead by more than one M.,
GMA: So will I still lead by more than one
overall?
M., overall?
Garcillano: More or less, it’s that advantage
Garcillano: More or less, it’s that advantage
ma’am. That’s more or less how it will come out.
ma’am. Parang ganun din ang lalabas.
GMA: It cannot be less than one M.?
GMA: It cannot be less than one M.?
Garcillano: We will make it happen, ma’am.
Garcillano: Pipilitin ho natin yan. Pero as of
But as of the other day, it was 982.
the other day, 982.
GMA: Exactly.
GMA: Kaya nga eh.
Garcillano: And then if we can get more in
Garcillano: And then if we can get more in
Lanao.
Lanao.
GMA: Is it not over yet?
GMA: Hindi pa ba tapos?
Garcillano: Not yet, ma’am. There are still
Garcillano: Hindi pa ho, meron pang darating
results from seven municipalities coming in.
na seven municipalities.
GMA: Oh ok, ok.
GMA: Ah ok, ok.
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would be better off without Arroyo at the helm of government.159 The
majority of Metro Manila residents prefer an impeachment to the President’s
resignation.160 Nearly eight out of ten Filipinos want the President out of
office even before she completes her six-year term, whether by resignation,
impeachment, or unconstitutional means.161 Arroyo was rated the worst of
the five presidents the Philippines has had since the administration of her
father, President Diosdado Macapagal.162
Arroyo, like Marcos, is perpetuating herself in power with a dubious
electoral mandate. Her administration, like Estrada’s, had also been racked
by scandal and charges of corruption. By debasing the popular will and
desecrating good governance, President Arroyo has made herself a prime
candidate for removal through another popular uprising. If people power is
about the restoration of democracy and a call to public accountability, then
there should be sufficient reason for another uprising. Yet there is no
outrage.
Instead, Filipinos appear to be split down the middle and are
displaying, instead of indignation, indecisiveness. Former President Aquino
has asked Arroyo to resign163 while former President Fidel V. Ramos, is
standing by (sometimes literally) the embattled President.164 The Protestant
Church favors resignation,165 but the Catholic Church does not.166 Business
groups167 and the country’s schools are also divided.168 Political parties
allied with the President are experiencing internal rifts.169 A faction of the
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President’s cabinet resigned.170 Arroyo’s supporters are staging their own
demonstrations to oppose her removal from office.171
The present crisis is still stewing but several views have surfaced in an
attempt to explain the Filipinos’ sudden reluctance to take to the streets.
First, there may be genuine disagreement as to whether President Arroyo
actually committed any offense when she spoke to the election
commissioner. Some sectors of society probably require a direct command
from the President to election officials to commit fraud before they take to
the streets. A mere conversation with an election officer, in this view, is not
sufficient.
Second, commentators have suggested that Filipinos are suffering
from “People Power fatigue” and will not mount a revolt against the
government, especially without support from a more professional and nonpoliticized military.172 Analysts are claiming that Filipinos have grown tired
of taking to the streets to sack their leaders only to discover that their
problems go beyond individual personalities.173 Still others explain that this
“fatigue” is actually the peoples’ refusal to be used in the latest round of
intra-elite wars.174 Another uprising, from this point of view, would be a
waste of time since people power has not brought about genuine changes in
Philippine politics.
A third view is that Vice President Noli de Castro is not yet ready to
assume the presidency and that he will merely perpetuate elite politics.175
He is regarded as “a political novice, a former radio broadcaster who once
served a lackluster Senate term and is perceived as an intellectual
lightweight.”176 Some sectors have identified de Castro as the only
impediment to another people power revolt.177 Perhaps, consistently with
my arguments here, there is no uprising because there is no one for the
people to shift allegiance to.
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Fourth, it is possible that Filipinos are simply allowing their
institutions to work. Rather than marching in the streets to demand the
president’s resignation, they would like to see the removal done through an
impeachment trial.
Finally, the Filipinos’ inaction may be explained as a function of the
role of class. It has been suggested that the middle class and business
community supported Arroyo’s victory and paid little attention to charges of
fraud, reasoning that her margin of victory “was significant enough, even
discounting the margin of fraud.”178
Now that The Tapes have shaken the boat, they are in a real dilemma.
Accustomed in [EDSA I] and [EDSA II] to taking the high ground and
marching in the streets against discredited presidents, they are now the ones
calling for calm and sobriety. In 1986 and 2001, they advocated “people
power” over constitutional and legal processes, but today are the ones
arguing for stability and “the rule of law.”179
The middle class is standing by its choice and making every excuse
for the President. The Catholic Church, quick to condemn Estrada for his
sins, was even quicker in demanding his resignation. In contrast, its
response to the present crisis is markedly conservative. The Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines issued a statement where it invoked
the Constitution as the anchor for the resolution of the present crisis:
Our political leaders have to be the first to observe and
faithfully implement the Constitution. Revolving the crisis has
to be within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of
the land so as to avoid social chaos, the further weakening of
political systems, and greater harm in the future.180
This is astonishing considering that the Catholic Church helped spark the
removal of Messrs Marcos and Estrada. It is most likely that if the tapes had
caught Joseph Estrada conversing with election officials, the Church would
call for his immediate resignation and that there would be less divisions in
the various sectors of society.
Perhaps the Filipinos’ sudden display of docility can be explained by
any one or a combination of all these factors. In any case, these recent
events suggest that people power is not a simple burst of outrage. I am
inclined to believe that it is a calculated response to a political crisis insofar
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as it actually considers its potential consequences, particularly to one’s class
interests. In other words, the potential consequence of Arroyo’s removal,
particularly to middle and upper class interests is tempering the public
display of people’s allegiance. The absence of a suitable replacement for the
President has checked popular outrage—to the President’s relief.181
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